526

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH vs. WHITE'S ADMINISTRATOR.

"Having thus sufficiently investigated the nature of and ingredients in a right of action ex delicto, I shall in the ensuing chapters
proceed to speak-lst, of Torts to the Person and Reputation;
2dly, of Torts to Property, whether Real or Personal; 3dly, of
Torts not directly affecting the Person, Reputation or Property.
"Besides the convenience of the arrangement just suggested for
an elementary treatise, there is, to some extent, authority for its
adoption ; for instance, Sir Henry Finch tells us, that our law
regards the person above his possessions-life and liberty mostfreehold and inheritance above chattels-and chattels real above
personal."
But we cannot afford space to pursue the thread of subsequent
chapters, and must now bring both our quotations and remarks to a
P. F.
close.
RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of t7e United States for Maryland.

171 Bquity.
THE BOARD

OF FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. SAMUEL S. MSMASTER, ADMINISTRATOR DE

BONIS NON, WITH

TEE WILL

ANNEXED,

OF ANNE

P.

WHITE.

1. Where the courts of a state in their ordinary jurisdiction as Courts of Equity, undertake to aid and direct an administrator in the execution of his trust, and where
the interests of the State's own citizens as well as of non-residents are involved].
and the non-residents are made parties to the cause in the manner pointed out by
special legislation, the rule of comity requires that paramount authority should
be yielded to the court before which the proceedings were first instituted, and
where the jurisdiction first attaches, notwithstanding the courts may have concurrent jurisdiction, one being a Federal and the other a State tribunal.
2. A bequest in awill "I leave the whole of said fund in the hands of my executor.
to be by him applied to the support of Missionaries in India, as it is my desire to
aid, &c., the same to be appliedunder the direction of the General Assembly's Board
of Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States," is void for uncertainty.

Wallers, for complainant.
Bartol, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
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GILEs, J.-This bill was originally filed 26th March, 1855, by
the complainants above named against the defendant McMaster, as
administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, of Anne P. White,
to enforce the payment of a bequest contained in the will of Miss
White. Subsequently an amended bill has been filed, making "The
Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America" parties complainants to the cause.
The will which gives rise to this controversy cohtains the following
provision:
"It is my will and desire, that the remainder of my money remain
in the hands of Mr. Lewis West and Mr. David 'hite, and I hereby
direct them to pay over to my mother the interest thereof every
year whilst she is a married woman, and if she should ever be a
widow, I leave the whole sum to her to be at her disposal. And if
my mother is never a widow and departs this life in a married state,
I leave the whole of said fund in the hands of my executor to be
by him applied to the support of missionaries in India, as it is my
desire to aid in the instruction of the poor heathen in the way to
life everlasting. The same to be applied under the direction of the
General Assembly's Board of Missions of the Presbyterian Church
in the United States."
It is admitted that the mother of Miss White died in 1854 a married woman; that Miss White died in 1843 ; that George Hudson,
the executor named in the said will, is dead; and letters of administration do bonis non, with the will annexed, on the estate of Miss
White have been granted by the Orphans' Court for Worcester
county (the place of Miss White's residence) to the defendant, and
that lie has paid the debts of the deceased and other legacies mentioned in her will, and has now in hand the sum of $4,521 87, to be
applied to the bequest mentioned in the clause of the will hereinbefore recited, if the same be valid. The will itself bears date in 1889.
The answer filed by-the defendant states that the said amount in
his hands has been claimed by the surviving husband of Mrs. Williams, the mother of Miss White, and also by her next of kin, on
the ground that the above bequest is void and cannot be enforced
by any one, and is also claimed by the complainants, and that to
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protect himself in the settlement of Miss White's estate he has filed
a bill of interpleader in the Circuit Court for Worcester, against all
the said parties, which is still pending in that court, and in which
cause an order of publication has been passed against the original
complainants in this cause, as absent defendants.
This cause has been heard on bill and answer, and is now submitted for final decree. Its discussion involves two very interesting
questions.
1st. Has the Circuit Court for Worcester county full jurisdiction of this case on the bill of interpleader filed by defendant ? and
2d. What is the character of the bequest in controvery ? Is it not
void in this State, as being too indefinite and uncertain ? Now, in
the examination of the first question, it must be admitted by all,
that if the Circuit Court for Worcester county has jurisdiction, as
the bill of interpleader was filed in it in 1854, long before the institution of this suit, it would be the duty of this court to suspend
further proceedings in this cause to await the action of the Circuit
Court for Worcester county. This is the courtesy which courts of
concurrent jurisdiction should exercise towards each other. For
where different courts have concurrent jurisdiction, that before
which proceedings are first instituted, and where jurisdiction first
attaches, has authority paramount to the others. See Stearnes vs.
Stearnes, 16 Mass. 171, 203; Smith vs. ITfclver, 9 Wheaton, 532 ;
The Bobert Fulton, Paine, 621; rPeck vs. Jeaness and others,
7 Howard, 624; 3 Story on the Constitution, 624; Winn vs.
Albert, 2d Md. Chan. Decisions, 42; Brown vs. Wallace, 4 G. &
J., 495; Wallace vs. McConnell, 13 Peters, 136.
Now, had the Circuit Court for Worcester county jurisdiction in
this matter so as to effect the rights of the complainants ? Complainants being non-residents, have their option to bring their suit
in this court, unless they have submitted or are made parties in
some form to the cause in the said Circuit Court for Worcester
county. While it is admitted that no judgment in personam will be
valid against a non-resident not served with process and who has
never appeared to the suit, yet all our courts act daily upon the
rights of non-residents through their property, either real or per-
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sonal, found within their jurisdiction, and such judgments are valid
and binding. This is the basis of our attachment laws and of our
proceedings to sell real estate for division, &c., even though nonresidents may be interested.
The estate of Miss White must be administered by the defendant
under and according to the laws of this State, and in the execution
of his trust, he had the clear right, if from any circumstances he
could not safely administer the estate, except with the aid and under
the direction of a court of equity, to apply to the Circuit Court
of Worcester county, in the manner he has pursued. By such a
course, the rights of every claimant would be examined, and full
and adequate relief and protection afforded to the defendant in the
settlement of his trust. And by the Act of this State passed in
1826, chapter 199, full and ample notice of six months by the order
of publication, is given to the complainants, warning them to appear
and maintain their title to the said bequest. But the learned
solicitor for the complainants has contended that, as they are nonresidents, they have a constitutional right to have their cause decided
alone by a Circuit Court of the United States.
Sich is no doubt the right of the non-resident in suits in personam
or in attachments against his property to compel his appearance;
and where a judgment is sought against him in personam. But it
is doubtful whether it can be extended to embrace a case like this,
where the courts of this State in their ordinary jurisdiction as
courts of equity, undertake to aid and direct an administrator in
the execution of his trust; and where the interests of citizens of
this State as well as of non-residents are involved, and the nonresidents are made parties to the cause in the mode pointed out by
the statute. By the 12th section of the Act of Congress, 1789, ch.
20, provision is made for the removal of a suit brought in a State
court against the citizen of another State, to the Circuit Court of
the United States, where the amount claimed exceeds the sum of
$500. But this provision has been decided only to apply to cases
where the non-resident is sole defendant, or all the defendants are
non-residents.
This case, therefore, could not be removed to this court under that
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And the 11th section of the same act gives original cognizance

concurrent with the courts of the several States to the Circuit Court
of all suits at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, and the suit
is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State, &c., &c.
The two cases to which I have been referred to sustain. the proposition of the learned counsel, are Suydam and Boyd vs. Broadnax and others, 14 Peters, 67 ; and Shelby vs. Bacon and others,
10 Howard, 56.
In the first case the plaintiffs were citizens of New York, and the
defendants were administrators of Newton, a citizen of Alabama,
whose estate had been declared insolvent in a proceeding taken under
a statute of that State which provided, that in such a case no suit
or action should be commenced against the administrator.
The Supreme Court only decided that the plea that the estate of
the deceased was insolvent, was not sufficient in law to abate the
plaintiff's action in the Circuit Court. In the second case, the bill
was {ied in the Circuit Court of the United Statis, in Pennsylvania.
by : citizen of Kentucky, against the assignees of the late Bank of
the United States, to maintain his claim and for a distribution of
the assets of said bank. The defence was, that the assignees had
filed the accounts for their receipts and disbursements in the proper
court in Pennsylvania, and were there alone responsible ; and that
the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. But the
Supreine Court overruled the plea, and decided, that as the proceeding in the State court was not a proceeding in rem, and as the
complainants had not submitted or been made a party in any form,
to the special jurisdiction of the State court, the said plea was no
bar to the bill of the complainant. I confess that the question is
one of great difficulty, but I can see no safe way of preventing a
conflict between the action of the Federal and State courts, than in
cases similar to the one now before me, to adhere strictly to the
rule of courtesy to which I hav-p-referred, and to leave to the court
which first takes jurisdiction of the matter, its final adjudication.
And this I understand to be the view of the law upon this subject
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taken by Judge Curtis in the case of Hallett and others vs. -Dexter,
administrator of Fenner, to be found in 1 Curtis, 178. That case
was similar in many respects, to this. A bill was filed by complainants, some of whom were non-residents of Rhode Island, in the
Circuit Court of the United States for that State, against the
defendant as administrator of Fenner, or an account and settlement
of his administration; and the defence was that the defendant was
in process of. settling his administration before a Probate Court of
Rhode Island, and ought not to be compelled to account in this
court; and so Judge Curtis decided, with the case of Shelby vs.
Bacon, 10 Howard, before him.
The second question, it appears to me, is free from all difficulty,
and however much I may regret that the pious intenti6ns of the
testatrix will be defeated, yet sitting here to decide this question in
accordance with the law of this State, I cannot do otherwise than
pronounce the bequest void for uncertainty. The money is to be
retained by the executor, to be by him applied to the support of
Missionaries in India under the direction of the General Assembly's
Board of Missions, &c. The executor is the trustee, and the Missionaries are the cestui que trusts ; and the Board of Missions is
merely the agent to direct the manner in which the money shall be
applied to the beneficiaries of the trust. Now, who can enforce the
execution of this trust in a Court of Chancery ? What missionaries
are meant, all the missionaries in India of every denomination, or
only those of the Presbyterian Church ? and if the latter, those in
India to-day, or only those who were there when the testatrix died ?
For I take it to be the true rule of law in reference to all such
bequests, that the beneficiaries of the trust must be certain and
definite; so clearly ascertained that they have a standing in a cdurt
of equity to enforce the trust.
If such be the case, the bequest is good, although there may be
no trustees appointed by the will to carry out the trust, or in whom
the legal estate can vest. But whether there be a competent trustee
or not, if the cestui que trusts are not clearly ascertained by the
will, the devise or bequest is void. Such is the unbroken current
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of decisions in this and all other States which have not adopted the
statute of charitable uses of the 43d of Elizabeth.
I need only refer, in support of this, to the following cases:
-Dashielvs. the Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 898 ; Same parties,
6 H. & J. 7: Baptist Association vs. Hart's .Bxrs., 4 Wheaton,
1; Wheeler vs. Smith and others, 9 Howard, (S. C.) 76 ; and to the
case of leade and others vs. Beale and Latimer, decided in this
court by my brother, the Chief Justice.
In that case, a bill was filed in this court by the complainants,
who represented "the Education Society of Virginia," to enforce
a bequest "to the Education Society of Virginia for the benefit of
the Theological Students at the Protestant Episcopal Theological
Seminary, near Alexandria, in the District of Columbia. The
Chief Justice decided that the bequest in that case was void by the
laws of this State; and even if the Education Society had been
incorporated and competent to become a legal trustee, the description of the cestui que trusts was so vague and indefinite, that it
would be impossible for the court to enforce or supervise the execution of the trust. This view of the law relieves me from the necessity of considering the argument of the complainant's solicitor, in
reference to the right and capacity of "the Trustees of the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America" to receive and take all bequests made to "the General
Assembly's Board of Missions," a body not incorporated and not
now in existence; or to the right of the original complainants to
enforce a bequest made to the "General Assembly's Board of
Missions."
Being of the opinion, therefore, that this bequest in Miss White's
wIM is void for the reasons I have given, I will sign a decree disthe bill filed in this case, with costs.

THE STATE vs. ALLMOND.

Supreme Court of Delaware-GeneralSessons, .Yew Castle, May
Term, 1856.
THE STATE 'vs. CHARLES M. ALLMOND.
1. Legislative power is an attribute of sovereignty belonging to the people, to be
exercised only by their representatives. The extent of the grant of it to the
Legislature, with its reservations and restrictions, are to be found only in the
Constitution itself.
2. The Legislature has power, as a police regulation, to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor; subject only to the laws of the United States regulating imports;
and these protect it only in the hands of the importer, in the original cask or
package.
3. Though a State is bound to admit an article thus imported under the laws of
Congress, it is not bound to find a market for its sale.
4. When sold by the importer in the original cask or package, or when broken up
for retail sale, it becomes subject to the State laws; and may be taxed, or the
sale of it prohibited.
5. Property in an article is the right to have and use it subject to law. The right of
sale is not an essential ingredient that may not be separated from the ownership;
and a law regulating or prohibiting the sale, does not take away any Tested right
of property.
6. In the social state, individual property is necessarily held subject to such laws of
regulation as are required for the well-being of society; and in a sovereign State,
the legislature, having the power to pass such laws, must judge of its limits and
extent.
7. The Act of 1855 prohibitingthe ale of intoxicating liquor for any other than
"mechanical, chemical and medicinal purposes only, and pure wines for sacramental use," saving the rights of the importer of foreign liquor under the importation laws, is Constitutional.

The defendant, who keeps a first class hotel in the city of
Wilmington, was indicted for selling intoxicating liquor contrary to
law. His case was selected, from many others of the same kind, to
test the constitutionality of the act of last session, known as the
prohibitory liquor law. It was tried at New Castle during the past
week, before Judges HARRINGTON, WOOTTEN and HOUSTON, and
excited much interest from the character of the questions, and
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importance of interests, involved.
great ability, by

It was argued at length, and with

Hon. J. A. Bayard and J. Wales, Willard Saulsbury and J. P.
Gomegys, Esqs., against, and by
Hon. C. S. Layton and Messrs. Bradford, Bates and Smithers,
for the law.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARRINGTON, C. J.-The defendant moves, on constitutional

grounds, to quash an indictment found against him for unlawfully
selling intoxicating liquors, contrary to the Act of Assembly of
February 27, 1855, entitled "An Act for the Suppression of
Intemperance," without having a valid and subsisting license as a
tavern-keeper under the Act of 1853, and without having a certificate to sell liquor under the Act of 1855.
This motion brings in question the validity of the act last referred
to; and has opened up the whole subject of constitutional power of
legislation, with its restrictions and qualifications; as well as the
particular exercise of it in the provisions of the act which the
defendant is supposed to have violated.
I proceed to express the opinion of the court on these questions.
The particular provisions of the act to which reference was made
inthe arguments are the following:
SECTION 1, Prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors, except as
afterwards provided, and makes it indictable; and makes proof of
the disposal of such liquor by any person who is the keeper of, or
interested in a tavern or other place of public entertainment, prima
facie and presumptive evidence that such liquor was sold contrary
to this act.
SEC. 2, Prohibits the giving or in anywise disposing of such
liquors to any intoxicated person, or person of intemperate habits,
as a beverage, and makes it indictable.
SEC. 3, Makes it unlawful and indictable to "own or keep" any
such liquor, "with intent to sell the same" contrary to the act, and
makes the pQssession of such liquor, by the accused, in a tavern or
other place of public entertainment primafacie evidence that such
liquor is kept for sale.
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Other sections provide for the appointment of a limited number
of persons to purchase and sell liquor for "mechanical, chemical
and medicinal purposes only, and pure wines for sacramental use;"
and for furnishing to every voter authority to sell to such persons,
liquor manufactured by him, of fruit or grain, the growth of land in
this State. But no license to purchase and sell shall be granted to
any one "who uses intoxicating liquor as a b.everage ;" nor to any
person who is at the time the keeper of or interested in any tavern
"or other public house of entertainment." The persons so appointed
are required to give security for duly observing the law.
SEC. 7, Punishes the making false statements with regard to the
use of liquor bought of licensed vendors, and
SEC. 8, Provides that "if any intoxicated person shall be found
in any public place, or disturbing the public peace and quiet," he
shall be fined, and for non-payment, imprisoned.
The offences under sections 7 and 8 are to be tried before justices
of the peace, with the right of appeal to this court, at any time
within five days after conviction, on entering into recognizance with
surety to appear and abide its judgment.
SEc. 18, Provides that the law shall not apply to the importer in
respect to liquor imported under laws of the United States, and
remaining in the original casks or packages, and so disposed of; but
that "the custom house certificates of importation, and proof of
marks on the casks or packages, corresponding thereto, shall not be
received as sufficient evidence that the liquor contained in said
casks or packages are those actually imported therein, but the
person to be benefited thereby shall be required to allege and prove
such fact aliunde.
SEC. 19, Excepts from the operation of the act, "cider or wine
manufactured from fruits, being the growth of land in this State,
owned or occupied by the manufacturer," and sold by him at the
place where made, in quantity not less than one gallon at a time.
SEC. 21, Exempts the use of liquor medicinally by physicians;
and
SEC. 27, Reserves rights under existing licenses, until their
expiration.
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This is a summary of the several sections of the act; but on the
present motion it is unnecessary to decide any other than the general
question of its constitutionality with reference to a person indicted
under the iirst section.
Legislative power is an attribute of sovereignty. Whether derived
from a written constitution, or existing prior to it, and merely
recognized for the purpose of being assigned to the proper department, it is the same. In this State, it exists in the people at large,
or has been delegated by them to representatives with certain
reservations and restrictions, expressly named in the constitution,
or necessarily implied from it, or such as may arise from the Federal
Union, as expressed or necessarily implied in the Constitution of
the United States.
The act under consideration has been assailed in the argument
as opposed to both of these Constitutions, and as violating the State
Constitution, both in its express restrictions and implied reservations.
What these implications are, have not been, and cannot be, very
satisfactorily explained; but it was argued that legislative power
may be so abused in its exercise as to exceed its own delegated
limits, and invade not merely the rights expressly reserved to the
people, but certain innate, inalienable rights, existing in the citizen
prior to the Constitution; and depending neither upon its recognition, nor reservation,-for judicial enforcement.
It is not easy to embrace a definite idea of this sublimated right,
without referring it to the acknowledged power of changing the
Constitution itself at the will of those by whom, and for whose
welfare it was made. Apart from this idea, it is difficult to conceive
of any power to make or unmake law that has not been delegated
to the people's representatives by the written Constitution, with the
restrictions therein contained, and the reservations made by what
is usually called the Bill of Rights. If there be any legislative
power beyond or above this, it would seem to belong to the people
themselves, to be exercised in the usual forms of organic change, or
by revolution.
The innate or natural rights are comprehensively referred to in
our Bill of Rights, which is believed to embrace, to the full extent,

THE STATE vs. ALLMOND.

this idea of a higher law, or the existence of rights paramount to the
Constitution itself. "Through Divifie Goodness (says the preamble
to the Constitution) all men have by nature the rights of worshiping
and serving their Creator according to their consciences, of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring and protecting reputation
and property, and in general of attaining objects suitable to their
condition, without injury one to another, and as these rights are
essential to their welfare, for the due exercise thereof power is
inherent in them."
But the great law of social self-preservation is equally a paramount
law essential to the enjoyment of the natural rights thus declared
to belong to "all men." Freedom of conscience cannot be secured;
life and liberty cannot be enjoyed and defended; nor property and
reputation acquired and protected; unless society has the power to
compel its members to respect these rights by imposing sanctions,
which, in the due course of law, shall even take away from those
who would prevent others from the enjoyment of them, the rights
thus declared to be natural rights, and which in fact constitute the
existence of the social system.
For this purpose, government is instituted among men, having its
sanctions both in the consent of the governed, and in the necessity
of putting even innate rights under such control as is essential to
their preservation. Hence the power to take life or restrain liberty;
to regulate the use or forfeit the enjoyment of property in the due
course of law; a power existing in the very structure and carried
out in the practice of every community; particularly in those which
give the best protection to these rights which are assumed to belong
to all men.
If the higher rights to life, liberty and the enjoyment of property
be thus subject to the sovereign power of the State, the power to
regulate the use of property to secure the enjoyment of these rights,
and promote the objects for which government is formed, cannot be
doubted. The Legislature may by general laws regulate and restrict
the use of property which it deems dangerous to the existence, peace
or welfare of society, and may prevent the acquisition of such kinds
of property as it considers so dangerous as to require such prohibi-
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tion. The Legislature of this State has done so from the beginning,
by prescribing the modes of acquiring and using the transfer and
disposition of property of all kinds; and the restriction or prohibition
not merely of certain kinds of property, but of trades, professions
and callings; thus regulating not only property itself, but the
personal industry and enterprise through which property is acquired.
I refer to the statutes, among the first enacted, for the conveyance
of property; the statute of wills; the intestate laws; all license
laws; laws regulating physicians, surgeons, attorneys, millers, ferries
and fisheries; laws regulating the weight and price of breadstuff,
and laws regulating inn-keepers and vendors of liquor generally,
which comes more directly to the matter under investigation.
As early as 1739, the act of 13 Geo. 2, prohibited the sale of
spirituous liquor by measure less than a gallon, and punch or mixed
liquors by any quantity whatever; and authorized certain officers
to regulate the price of liquor lawfully sold under these restrictions.
This legislation was followed by the act of June 24, 1786, "for the
suppression of idleness, vice and immorality," which, with other acts
of the same kind, was -in terms saved by the Constitutions of 1792
and 1832. From that day to this the sale of liquor in this State
has been under the restraint of laws more or less stringent, according to the will of the legislature; and the question now is, whether
the last act "for the suppression of intemperance,"-that of 1855,
differs in principle from the others; or whether the whole system
of restrictive legislation has been unconstitutional from the beginning.
With the policy or wisdom of the act under consideration we have
no concern. We did not make, and cannot repeal, this or any other
law. Our official duty is merely to decide whether the act in question is a law, passed by competent authority, within the scope of
legislative power. That duty will be performed without reference
to any other considerations than such as apply to an abstract question of constitutional law, and the power of this tribunal, derived
from the Constitution itself, to decide upon the validity of the act
in question, as an expression of legislative will.
It is the province of the judiciary to decide what is law; to pro-
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nounce invalid legislative acts unconstitutionally passed; and to
aiinul such as may violate constitutional restrictions; but it may
well be doubted whether a case can arise requiring of the judiciary
the exercise of an assumed power to annul any act of legislation
which the constitution itself does not condemn. Without a veto
power existing in any other department, the Constitution of this
State vests the whole legislative power in a Senate and House of
Representatives who represent all the people in the exercise of this
highest attribute of sovereignty. And when these representatives
are supposed in any act of legislation unwisely, or improperly, to
restrain what are assumed to be the rights of the people, it is for the
people themselves to correct the evil through legislative repeal, and
not by judicial usurpation.
The question, therefore, is whether the act of 1855 violates the
Constitution of this State, or of the United States. The argument
in respect to the latter has been that the restraints which it imposes
on the traffic in foreign liquor affects the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and lessens the revenue derived from the importation of liquor as an article of merchandise., This question belongs
appropriately to the federal courts, in which it'has been repeatedly
considered, with results which have even been the subject of dispute
in the argument of this case. That doubt would be enough to settle
this branch of the case; for no State Court would declare an act of
its own legislation unconstitutional on a question of conflict with a
power of Congress so doubtful in itself that the federal judiciary,
after repeated trials, have. not been able to define it. But we do
not so understand their decisions.
The right of the government to import, and the right of the State
to tax, regulate or restrict the sale of foreign goods, are both recognized by these decisions-(4 Wheat. Rep. 316, McCullou.qh vs. The
State of Maryfland; 12 Wheat. Rep. 453, Brown vs. Maryland;
and the License Cases in 5 Howard's Rep. 574.) The right of the
one arises from the power to regulate commerce; that of the other
exists as a police power, essential to the independence and sovereignty of the State. The judges differ about the precise line where
imports cease to be protected from State legislation as imports, and
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become, like all other property, subject to it ; but the dispute is not
whether the States have a right to tax or restrict imported goods
after they are broken up, or sold by the importers, but whether
these laws shall reach them in the importers' hands. The opinions
of Judges Daniel and Thompson go even to that extent, while the
judgment of the court only claims for imported goods immunity
from State legislation while unbroken in the importers' hands; and
that is precisely the exception contained in the 18th section of our
law.
In what are usually called "the License Cases," the Supreme
Court decided the following principles:That laws of Massachusetts providing that no person should sell
spirituous liquor in less quantity than twenty-eight gallons, without
a license to be granted by certain officers, and that such licenses
should not be granted when, in the opinion of these officers, the
public good did not require them to be granted;
That laws of Rhode Island forbidding the sale of such liquor in a
less quantity than ten gallons, though the liquor sold was foreign
liquor duly imported, and was bought of the importer; and,
That laws of New Hampshire imposing similar restrictions upon
domestic liquor sent from one State to another, and sold in the
original cask, were none of them liable to objection as infringing
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
These decisions meet any objection that can be made against the
Act of our legislature on these grounds. The cases were well considered; and, though the points ruled were necessarily confined to
the question of conflict with the authority of Congress, the validity
of such laws was fully recognized by all the judges of that court as
within the scope of legislative power within the States.
Chief Justice Taney -said, "Although a State is bound to receive
and permit the sale by the importer of any article of merchandise
which Congress authorizes to be imported, it is not bound to furnish
a market for it, nor to abstain from the passage of any law which
it may deem necessary, or advisable, to guard the health or morals
of its citizens, although such law may discourage importation, or
diminish the profits of the importer, or lessen the revenue of the
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general government. And if any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to
produce idleness, vice or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and
restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks
proper.
Mr. Justice Daniel said :-" Every State that is in any sense
sovereign and independent, possesses, andmust possess, the inherent
power of controlling property held and owned within its jurisdiction
and in virtue and under the protection of its own laws; whether that
control be exerted in taxing it, or in determining its tenure, or in
directing the manner of its transmission ; and this too, irrespective
of the quantities in which it is held or transferred, or the sources
whence it may have been derived."
Mr. Justice Woodbury said :-"1 From the first settlement of this
country, and in most other nations, ancient and modern, civilized or savage, it has been found useful to discountenance excesses
in the use of intoxicating liquor."
Mr. Justice Grier said:-" The true question presented by these
cases, and one which I am not disposed to evade, is, whether the
States have a right to prohibit the sale and consumption of an article of commerce which they believe to be pernicious in its effects,
and the cause of disease, pauperism and crime. It is not necessary,
for the sake of justifying the State legislation now under consideration, to array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism and crime
which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The
police power which is exclusively in the States, is alone competent
to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint
or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within the scope
of that authority."
Mr. Justice McLean said :-" The acknowledged police power of
a State extends often to the destruction of property." " The State
may regulate the sale of foreign spirits, and such regulation is valid
though it reduce the quantity of spirits consumed." Alicense may
be required to sell foreign articles, when those of domestic manufactures are sold without one; and if the foreign article be injurious to
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the health or morals of the community, a State may, in the exercise of that great and conservative police power which lies at the
foundation of its prosperity, prohibit the sale of it."
It is true that these views of the judges of the Supreme Court
have not the force of judgments binding on this court, and the same
may be said of the State decisions directly on the question of legislative power. But they are the opinions of eminent Constitutional
lawyers; and we might add the names of many other judges, as
well as of common law writers in support of the same principles.
We have seen no adjudged case which denies the power of a State
in the exercise of its sovereignty to regulate the traffic inliquor for
restraint,as well as for revenue; and, as a police measure, to restrict,
or prohibit, the sale of liquor as injurious to public morals, or dangerous to public peace. The subjection of private property in the.
mode of its enjoyment to the public good, and its subordination to
general rights liable to be injured by its unrestricted use, is a principle lying at the foundations of government. It is a condition of
the social state; the price of its enjoyment ; entering into the very
structure of organized society; existing by necessity for its preservation, and recognized by the Constitution in the terms of its reservation, as "the right of acquiring and protecting reputation and
property, and of attaining objects suitable to their condition, without injury one to another."
We come then to consider whether the act of 1855, "for the suppression of intemperance," violates any of the provisions of the
Constitution of this State; or is in any other way an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. We have already considered
this question vith reference to what are supposed to be the innate,
inalienable rights of citizens, and the powers of the judiciary to impose limits to legislative discretion, other than those imposed by the
Constitution itself; and we have failed to discern the existence of
such a power, with reference, at least, to the act of legislation which
we are now reviewing. We will not say that it cannot be maintained with reference to any supposable case, so plainly tyrannical
and unjust as to challenge universal condemnation; and yet it would
'le difficult to conceive a case of such legislation which would not vio-
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late some of the provisions of the Constitution itself. It is unsafe
to rest the existence of such a power upon the basis of so violent a
presumption. It were better to presume that no such legislation
could emanate from representatives of the people, to whom is committed legislative power, than to predicate on its abuse the right of
another department, which has no legislative power, to review legislative acts upon any other ground than their conformity with constitutional restrictions.
A few instances of such supposed extreme legislation have been
mentioned in the argument; yet no decision of this or of any other
court has been cited which is founded on such a power. The ]anguage of Judge Chase in Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas, 886; and of
the late Chief Justice of this court in Rice vs. Foster, 4 Harr., 479,
may imply the claim of such a power in extreme cases, but neither
the case then under consideration, nor the instances specified, required any such basis to support the opinion. They are all instances within the constitutional prohibition. A law that should
make a man a jpdge in his own cause would violate the provision in
section 8, for an impartialtrial, and take away the remedy which
it secures in all cases by due course of law, and an act which would
subvert our republican form of government, would violate the entire
Constitution of the State, and come in conflict with a provision of
the Constitution of the United States, which guaranties this form of
government to each of the States. The judgment in Bice vs. Foster
imposed no limit on legislative power as existing in the General
Assembly. It only denied the right to delegate that power to be
exercised by a direct vote of the people themselves; a principle
which has since been recognized, we believe, wherever it has been
judicially considered.
Without denying the judicial power, therefore, in any supposable
extreme case to annul a legislative act upon higher grounds than
those of express constitutional restriction, we do not affirm it. Our
case does not require it, and we are not ambitious of the distinction
for this court of furnishing the first adjudged case founded on such
a principle. The New York cases certainly do not furnish a precedent.
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On the question whether the grant of legislative power was restricted not only by-the express provisions of the written constitution, but mighfbe further -restrained by judicial--construction as
against fundamental principles of liberty, common reason and
natural rights, all the judges in terms repudiated the doctrine, except Judge Comstock; and he recoiled from it, as Chief Justice
Marshall did in Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 135, and avoided it
by saying, what is eqully true in the case before us, that "there is
no process of reasoning by which it can be demonstrated that the
'Act to prevent intemperance, pauperism and crime,' is void upon
principles and theories outside of the constitution, which will not
also, by an easier deduction, bring it in direct conflict with the constitution itself."
Judge Hubbard said "I am-opposed to the judiciary attempting
to set bounds to legislative authority, or declaring a statute invalid
upon any fanciful theory of higher law, or first principles of natural
right, outside the constitution.
Judge Selden. "To determine the extent of the law-making
power, we have only to look to the provisions of the constitution.
It has, and can have, no other limit than such as is there furnished,
and the doctrine that there exists in the judiciary some vague, loose,
and undefined power to annul a law, because in its judgment it is
'contrary to natural equity and justice,' is in conflict with the first
principles of government, and can never, I think, be maintained.
Judge Johnson is equally emphatic in denying the power, and
argues against it at some length, with great force and conclusiveness.
On this subject the case of Sharples8 and others vs. The MVayor
of Philadelphia, 9 Harris, 147, decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, presents, very fully, the arguments on both sides of
the question, but the judgment of the court is against the power.
The act in -question, therefore, is a police regulation plainly
within the scope of legislative power, as conceded by all the cases
cited, aid by none more fully than the recent New York decisions
upon the prohibitory liquor law of that State. And where the
object is a legitimate one, any means which the legislature may em.-
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ploy to attain it are lawful, if not inhibited by the Constitution
itself. The New York law, which authorizes the seizure and destruction of liquor in the hands of its owner, was held to impair the
vested right of property thus lawfully possessed at the time of its
passage, and we have no occasion to controvert the decision on that
point, as our law contains no such provision. But we must dissent,
and do dissent, from the position assumed by some of the judges in
those cases, and in the argument here, that the prohibition to sell
an article of merchandise destroys its character as property, and
takes away the vested rights of the owner. If this were true, the
sovereignty of the State would be robbed of nearly all its police
power, and the individual right to dispose of his property would be
above the right of the public to be protected in their morals, health,
peace or safety. Poisonous drugs; unwholesome food; infected
goods; demoralizing books or prints; combustible and explosive
substances, dangerous animals, and every species of property could
be held and transferred at the will of the owner. The vendible
quality of a thing is not of the substance of the thing in such sense
that they may not be lawfully separated, and the right to have or
own a thing does not oblige the State to furnish a market for its
sale. The right to sell it is conferred by law and may be taken
away by law, or its use prohibited in any specified form which is
deemed to be injurious or demoralizing. 1 Blac. Com., 138. Instances of this are so common in our legislation that I refer, in
addition to such as have been mentioned, only to the prominent
cases of the prohibition to sell slaves out of the State, and the prohibition of free negroes to own or lave, in possession fire-arms or
warlike instruments.
Restrictions on the sale of liquor fall under the same police power,
and have always been imposed bylaw. A license has been required
not for the purpose of revenue only, but for the purpose of restraint,
and as Judge McLean remarked in the case before referred to,
"4The necessity of a license presupposes a prohibition of the right
to sell, as to them who have no license." The purchase of liquor
under a license gives no power to sell without it; when the license
expires the vendible character of the article, in that market, ceases
35
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in his hands, and the 27th section of this act reserves the power of
sale under all licenses before granted by virtue of any law of the
State until such license expired.
As this consideration of the inviolability of the right of property
is the point of difference between the judges of New York in the
liquor cases referred to, and relied on in the argument, I shall examine them more particularly, to show that their views even of this
question, would not be adverse to the validity of our law, on the
principles assumed by them. If this be so, the defendant will be
left without the authority of any adjudged case denying the power
of the legislature to pass laws similar in character to the act under
which he is indicted; unless it be the decision of a single judge in
Indiana, expressed at chambers on the hearing of a habeas corpus
case.
In the W ynchamer case," Judge Comstoek, while he regards
the power of sale, we think erroneously, as "a fundamental right"
of property essential to its character as property, places his judgment on the "physical destruction" of the liquor as a result of the
law of New York. lie says, " On the day the law took effect it
was criminal to be in possession of intoxicating liquors, however
innocently acquired the day before. It was criminal to sell them,
and, under the law, therefore, no alternative was left to the owner
but their immediate destruction."
Judge Hubbard admits that "there is no constitutional restriction
on the power of the legislature in the regulation of the sale or
traffic in intoxicating drinksi whether affecting existing rights of
property in liquor or not. As a scheme of regulation the degree of
the limitation of the sale or traffic is a matter of legislative discretion." But he proceeds to say that the fault of the law he was
considering was that it did not profess to be a scheme of regulation.
"The plain design of the law seems to have been to cut off the
liquor itself, to insure its destruction by circumscribing the keeping
of it, and authorizing its seizure if kept in a forbidden place, or
with a criminal intent to sell. The entire right of sale within the
State at least, is prohibited, and in this, in my judgment, consists
the error of the law as it respects liquor owned when the law went
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into operation. If there had been any right of sale within the
State, r~served, for instance to a licensed vendor, although of minor
importance, it would have been sufficient, perhaps, to have impressed
the law with a character of regulation, and saved its validity."
Judge Seldon said, "while, therefore, I do not question the constitutionality of the general objects of the prohibitory law, and
fully concede the power of the legislature to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, for all except mechanical, chemical and medicinal
purposes, I cannot admit that it has the right to compel their immediate and unconditionaldestruction, as is, I think, substantially
done by this law."
Judge A. S. Johnson.-" I am not prepared to say that the
legislature may not, under the constitution, take away the right
of sale to the extent which this act contemplates. But by a general
prohibition of sale, irrespective of quantity and purpose, coupled
ith a prohibition even to keep it, except in a dwelling house where
no store, &c., is kept, and in places where certain arts and trades
are carried on, the legal existence which the law and the colstitution designate as property, is, in my judgment broken up, and the
private injury is as completely effected as if the thing were physically taken away." "This scheme taken together, in my judgment
is a scheme not of regulation, but of legal destruction of property,
which, as much as any other, was under the protection of the Constitution."
Each of the judges therefore, who decided against the constitutionality of the prohibitory liquor law of New York, based his
opinion on grounds of objection not applicable to the act of our
legislature, and sustained the principle of restrictive legislation to
the full extent required to support its validity. The distinction
upon which the majority went between the power to prohilit, and
the power to regulate, was of course denied by the minority, and is
not important in the decision of the case before us. We think it
cannot be maintained. If the power exist, the extent to which it
shall be exercisedmust be in the discretion of the legislature, provided
it be not merely colorable; and this was the view of the Supreme
Court in the "License cases." The point was there made in argu-
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ment, and was important. The law of Massachusetts gave the
license commissioners power to refuse all licenses, and they practically exerted it. Mr. Webster contended that there was no difference, (as there is none) in substance between an absolute prohibition
by the legislature, and a grant of power to another body to prohibit.
The law was therefore prohibitory of retailing liquor under twentyeight gallons. But none of the judges recognized the distinction;
some of them repudiated it. Judge Catron said, "I admit as inevitable that if the State has the power of restraint by licenses to any
extent, she has the discretionary power to judge of its limit, and
may go to the length of prohibiting sales altogether, if such be her
policy."
If we were to hold, therefore, that the act of our legislature which
rstrains, and we admit very closely restrains, the sale of intoxicating liquor, was unconstitutional, we should go beyond any case
heretofore adjudged, denying, on constitutional grounds, the power
of the legislature to regulate this kind of property for the protection
of the health and morals of the community; a police power recognized in the theory, and asserted in the practice, of this and .perhaps
every other State. We should overrule case after case decided in
other States on acts not to be distinguished from ours in principle,
and disregard the opinions of the ablest judges, including every
judge of the Supreme Court of the United States who has expressed
an opinion on the question. We should oppose the long continued
and well settled practice of our own State, commencing with its
earliest history, in a course of legislation on the same subject, differing only in degree and not in principle from the act in question;
and we should in effect repeal a large number of laws, which, for
other purposes, assert the right of government to regulate the use
and enjoyment of private property for the public good. Whatever
may be supposed to be the objections to this law founded on its expediency or policy, or its injurious operation upon the large amount
of property invested in the trade which it restrains, this court cannot assume the power to annul it on any such considerations.
The principles before stated sustain the general provisions of this
law as within legislative power and not prohibited by any express
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constitutional restrictions. The duty of the court therefore is simply to pronounce it a law constitutionally enacted, and to leave all
other questions with regard to it where such questions properly
belong, with the people's representatives, and the people themselves.
If it impose unnecessary restraints on the use or transfer of property; if it unwisely restrain any of their liberties, either in a restricted or more general sense; if its policy be doubtful, or its
precedent dangerous, it is at most but an abuse of legislative power,
to be remedied by the people, whose rights it is supposed to invade,
in the constitutional mode of legislative repeal. If, on the contrary
it contain the elements of reform for an admitted social evil, and
is, what its authors designed it to be, and its friends insist it is, an
Act for the Suppression of Intemperance, its wisdom and expediency
will be ultimately vindicated by the people, as its constitutionality
has been on the present trial, in the opinion of the court.
The motion to quash the indictment is therefore denied.

ITn thre CincinnatiSuperior Court,'Special Term, June, 1855.
1

CHARLES ATWATER vs. WILLTAM F. ROELOFSON ET AL.

1. A. loaned Et. A. $10,000; the loan was made in the city of Cincinnati, and was
received in a draft drawn by D. in Cincinnati on A. in New Haven, which was accepted payable in New York, and there paid.
2. To secure the payment of said loan, E. A. by her attorney executed a promissory
note for $10,000, payable five years after date, and also ten other notes for the
sum of five hundred dollars each, payable semi-annually, being the interest notes
on said loan at the rate of ten per cent; all said notes were payable at the office
of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co., N. Y.
To secure the payment of said notes, E. A. executed a mortgage to A. on certain real estate in the city of Cincinnati.
In suit brought in Cincinnati to collect the amount of these notes, and to foreclose this mortgage.
ld:l. That the law of Ohio, (where it was lawful to contract for te-L per cent.
interest,) governid the construction of this contract, and not the law of New York.
where a similar contract would have bWen void for usury.
IFrom 2 Handy's Sup. Court, Rep. 19 ; We are indebted to the Messrs. Handy,
for the early sheets of their volume from which this case is taIen.
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4. Where in such suit a counterclaim is filed, asking the cancellation of said notes
and mortgage on the ground of usury; in no case would the court grant such
affirmative relief, unless the party should do what was equitable and just, viz: pay
back the money he actually received.
5. Where a power of attorney is executed, authorizing the attorney "to make loans
and contract debts, and for such purpose use the name of the principal," and the
attorney makes a loan, but instead of receiving money receives a draft on New
York. this is a proper exercise of his authority.

This action was brought to obtain a sale of land, mortgaged to
secure a note of $500, due and unpaid. The same mortgage, purported to secure eleven notes: a note for $10,000, payable five
years after the 10th September, 1852, and ten notes of $500 each,
payable semi-annually after that date, being the interest at the
rate of 10 per cent. per annum on the $10,000. One of these interest notes, dated and executed in Cincinnati, but made payable in
the city of New York, having become due and being unpaid, was
made the foundation of the action. The petition set out the note
and mortgage, and asked for a sale of the mortgaged premises.
To the petition the defendants Roelofson and wife filed an answer
and counterclaim, asking as relief the delivery up of the notes and
the cancellation of the mortgage. The grounds of this prayer for
relief, as stated in the answer and counterclaim, were : 1st, that the
notes being made payable in New York, and the rate of interest
being greater than that allowed by the laws of that State, the contract was void; 2d, that the notes were executed under a power of
attorney, which on its face only authorized the borrowing of money,
and the contract having been made for a bill of exchange, and not
for money, the authority had not been pursued, and there having
been no ratification on the part of the principal, by receiving the
money or otherwise, the notes and mortgage were not valid.
It appeared from the statements in the pleadings, that the loan
of the $10,000 was made in Cincinnati, and the notes and mortgage
there executed; that the $10,000 was received in a draft of John
D. Jones, on Charles Atwater, New Haven, which was accepted
payable in New York, and there actually paid. There was a statement in the answer and counterclaim, that the notes and mortgage
were not to be valid in the event there should be a default in the
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payment of the draft. The interest to be paid on the loan was at
the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, which rate, under the law of
Ohio, was legal; the notes were made payable at the office of the
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company in New York, where the
rate of interest allowed was 7 per cent. and contracts for a higher
rate declared void.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GiiOLSOX, J.-The point was not taken on the argument of
this case, that the counterclaim asking to be relieved from
securities alleged to be usurious, contains no offer to pay what
is really and justly due. It may be as claimed for the defendants, that, if the contract is to be governed by the law of New
York, the security is invalid on the ground of usury; but I do not
suppose the courts of New York would on the ground of usury give
a party relief in its nature affirmative, without lie submitted to do
what was equitable and just-and that, in this class of cases, is the
payment of the money actually received, and legal interest.
The case having been submitted on the question, whether the
contract in respect of interest is to be governed by the law of Ohio
or the law of New York, and as that question will arise when the
pleading comes to be considered in the light of an answer or defence
to this action, I will proceed to its consideration, notwithstanding
the objection I have noticed.
The law of the State of Ohio allows interest on a loan of money,
evidenced by a note, at the rate of ten per cent. per annum. A
person domiciled in Ohio, borrows money from one domiciled in Connecticut, and makes a note in the State of Ohio, where the debt is
contracted and the money is to be used, for the amount with interest
at ten per cent.. payable in the State of New York, in which State
interest at a greater rate than seven per cent. is not allowed. By
what law is this contract to be governed ?
Looking at the question upon principle, and in view of the nature
and character of laws regulating the rate of interest, their object
and intent, I should not have the slightest difficulty in coming to a
conclusion. Parties who contract for the temporary or permanent
possession of most articles of property, are allowed to make their
own agreement for the compensation to be paid, and in the absence
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of any undue advantage or fraud, such agreement is sustained. The
legislation of most countries has regulated the compensation to be
paid for the use of money. The use or interest of money is fixed
at a certain per cent. on its amount. The amount of this per centage
is regulated by the supposed value or worth of the use of money.
The country, therefore, where the possession of money is parted
with, and where it is used, should be looked to in fixing the proper
allowance to be paid for its use. This would be the rule in the
absence of any special law regulating the matter, and the same
principle should govern where there is a conflict of those laws. If
a man should hire a horse or a carriage at some place within the
State of Ohio, and should agree to make a proper compensation and
pay the same at some place "inthe State of Kentucky, no one would
imagine, that, in fixing that compensation, regard would be had to
the place in Kentucky. The question would be, what had the -use
of the article been worth to the p9rty in the place where, by contract, he had obtained its possession.
And here an analogy between the use of any other article and
money presents itself in another view, and the effect of legislation
in regulating the worth of the use of money upon ordinary principles
of law is to be seen. If there be an agreement to procure and
deliver any article of commerce, for which an agreed price is paid,
in a particular place, at a particular time, and this agreement is not
complied with, the law furnishes a measure of damages, the market
value of the article at the place and time, and interest on that
value. In such a case the place where the delivery is to be made
is regarded, in ascertaining what the use or possession of the property would have been worth to the party entitled to enjoy or receive. In analogy to this it is entirely proper on principle, that
where there is an agreement to pay money at a particular place, the
law of that place.should be regarded in determining the amount to
be paid for the loss of its use from the time it should have been
delivered, until it be actually received. Now both the worth of the
use of money, when parties contract for such use, and the loss or
damage involuntarily sustained by being deprived of its use, are
usually regulated by legislation. Interest is allowed, as growing
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out of the contract of parties, and also as damages for the detention
of money, and the law may allow, within prescribed limits, the latter to be liquidated by previous agreement. The same case frequently presents both questions: what is the contract rate for
the use of money, and what is the damage rate for its detention ? And it is obvious one of these questions may be decided
by the lex loci, and the other by the lex fori. A like distinction
was taken in the case of -Duncanvs. Canpbell, 12 Simons, 616, 635,
where it was said: "It is quite possible for an instrument to be of
such a nature as that, with respect to one part of it, it is to be dealt
with according to one species of law, and, with respect to another
part of it, according to a different species of law."
In determining, therefore, either the proper rate of itercst to be
calculated, or the effect of usury laws, the nature of the claim, in
respect of which interest is allowed, should be considermd. It should
be considered, whether the claim for interest ariscs from an express
or implied agreement, as to the worth of the use of money to the
borrower, or as damages to the lender for its detention. The keeping this distinction in view, will, I think, explain some of the authorities wich appear to conflict.
In the same connection, there is a matter worthy of consideration, before proceeding to an examination of the authorities. It has
been assumed, that it is a part of the contract in this case, that a
greater rate of interest than that allowed by the law of New York
shall be paid, and that this appears from the provisions in the note
that it is payable in the city of Niqw York. In what view, and to
what ext-ent is that provision a part of the contract between the
parties ?
Undoubtedly, a covenant or contract may be made, by which the
place of the payment of money may be limited as a condition and
the party not be bound to pay in any other place. But is this the
effect of introducing into a promissory note a clause that the amount
is pxyable at a particular place ? Is it not the effect of such a note
as against the maker, that the money to be paid becomes a debt due
generally and universally, and that it will continue due, though
there be a neglect on the part of the holder of the note to attend at
the time and place to receive ? Is it not the only effect of such a
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clause or provision, that the maker may show as matter of defence
that ie was in attendance to pay, but the holder was not in readiness
to receive, and does this defence extend any further than as a bar
to the tamages for the detention of the debt.
The effect of such a provision in a bill of exchange or promissory
note was a matter of much discussion in England, and was finally
settled by the House of Lords, in the case of Bowe vs. Young, 2 B.
& B. 165, 6 Eng. Com. Law, 58. In that case it was held, that it
was a substantial part of the contract between the parties, and unless there was a compliance with its terms, by presentingthe bill or
note at the time and place specified, there could be no recovery
against the acceptor or maker. This decision led to an act of Parliament, providing that the rule so laid down should not apply
unless the parties added the words .not elsewhere or otlierwise to the
clause providing for payment at a particular place.
In this country the rule has been for a long time, and most
uthoritatively settled in a manner contrary to the decision of the
House of Lords, and in accordance with the views of several of the
judges delivered in the case of Boue vs. Young, particularly
Abbott, C. J., and Bayly, J. (See Appendix to case of Bowe vs.
Young, ub sup.) The settled doctrine in this country is, that such
a, provision in a bill or note in no respect limits the liability of the
acceptor, or maker, for the debt, and can only be relied on as a
.matter of defence, by the acceptor, or maker, against any claim for
damages for the detention of the debt, or i.s non-payment at the
time stipulated.
If such be the effect of the provision in the note making it payable at a particular place, it is difficult to und.1e'rstand how the laws
of that place as to interest can be relied on to annul and destroy its
obligation as a security for the debt. If the obligation to
pay the debt be general and universal. and valid according to the law.i of the place where contracted, a clause in the
security, only affecting the question of damages for its detention
after it becomes due, cannot, upon any proper princirle, tie regarded
as a bar to a recovery.
It is laid down as the general rule, that interest is payable agreeably to the law of the place where the contract is made. Hosford
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vs. . ichols, 1 Paige 225; 2 Kent Com., 460, note c. It is stated
in a number of authorities, by expressions more or less definite and
precise, that if the contract is to be performed in another country,
then the interest is to be regulated by the law of that country.
The law of the place of the contract yields to the law of the place in
which it is to be performed. It is remarked by Chancellor Kent,
that as to this e.;ception to the operation of the lex lei, there are
numerous distinctions and jarring decisions, 2 Oom. 459. It is to
be observed, that in some of the decisions it does not very clearly
appear what is to be understood by the performance of the contract.
There are a number of decisions, that where a debt is contracted
in one country, and is to be repaid in another, after a default in
payment, the damages by way of interest are calculated according
to the law of the country in which the payment should have been
made. "The consequences of non-payment are to be governed by
the law of the country in which the payment was contracted to be
made." Cooper vs. .Earl of Waldegrave, 2 Beav. 284. It was
said in that case : "The contract of the acceptor, which alone is now
to be considered, is to pay in England: the non-payment of the
money when the bill becomes due is a breach in :England of the
contract which was to be performed in England. Upon the breach,
the right to damages or interest immediately accrues; interest is
given as compensation for the non-payment in England, and for the
delay of payment suffered, and I think that the law of England,
i. e. the law of the place where the default has happened, must govern
tlhe allowance of interest which arises out of that default."
It is almost too evident to require any remark, after what bas
been already said, that the law which should govern the consequences
of non-payment, the compensation for the delay of payment after a
breach, does not necessarily apply to the original agreement of loan
or indebtedness, to the compensation for the use of the money before
the time of payment, before the breach of the contract. It would
be singular, indeed, that a law, applicable only as regulating the
consequences of non-payment, should be held to operate to render
null and invalid the obligation securing the debt to be paid.
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It is manifest that in the case cited, and in many others of a likc
kind, in which the same expression "where the contract is to bt
performed," is to be found, no reference is made to the contract of
loan already executed by parting with the money and forbearing
for the stipulated time, but to the contract for repayment and the
consequences of the breach of that contract.
There are cases in which a contract was made in one country for
a loan to be received and enjoyed in another. "According to the
case of T/]omson vs. Powles, it is now the received doctrine at
Westminster Hall, that the rate of interest on loans was to be governed by the law of the place where the money was to be used or
paid, to which the loan had reference, and that a contract made in
London to pay in America, at a rate of interest exceeding the lawful interest in England, was not a usurious contract, for the stipulated interest was parcel of the contract, 2 Kent Com. 460;
2 Simons Rep. 194.
From the above authorities it appears, that a contract made, for
instance, in New York, for money to be paid and received in Ohio
.1loan, for which interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum
a:11
was reserved, would be legal, and might be enforced if made in good
faith, and not as a device to avoid the usury laws of New York,
either in the courts of New York or Ohio. But I imagine no case
can be found, in which it has been held, that a contract made, for
instance in Ohio, for money to be paid and received in New York,
for which interest at ten per cent., or any rate higher than that
allowed by the laws of New York, was reserved, would be deemed
valid. Such a contract would stand on the same ground in all respects as if wholly executed in New York; for in that State in substance the contract would have been made; there the money would
have passed from the possession of the lender to that of the borrower.
I do not feel that it can be necessary for me to say anything further
to show, tbat the principle on which such a contract would be held
invalid has no application to such cases as the present. If the
authority relied on by the counsel for the defendants, (and it is certainly very eminent authority, Story Conf. Laws,) has reference t 9
such a contract as I have stated, then it meets my full approbation.

ATWATER vs. ROELOFSON ET AL.

But though that high authority should be construed as extending to
the present case, I think, for the reasons already given, it cannot be
sustained on principle, and that it is outweighed by other highly
respectable authorities. Indeed, it might have been sufficient to
refer to several, which being from the State of New York actually
in point and uncontradicted, ought to be considered as conclusive
upon the question, what is the law of New York on the subject? In
the case of Depaw vs., Humphreys, 20 Martin La. Rep. 1, as stated
with approbation by Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, 2 Com.
460, it was held, that "if the rate of interest be specified in the
contract, and it be according to the law of the place where the contract was made, though that rate be higher than is lawful by the law of
the place where payment was to be made, the specified rate of interest
at the place of the contract has been allowed by the courts of justice
in that place, for that is a part of the substance of the contract." In
the case of Chapman vs. Robinson, 6 Paige, 627, this decision was
considered and approved by Chancellor Walworth. To this decision
of the Chancellor it has been objected that the question did not arise.
This objection can scarcely apply to a subsequent case, Pratt vs.
Adams, 7 Paige, 615. In that case the Chancellor said, referring
to a contract of loan made as in the present case in the State of
Ohio : "If the contract was not illegal by the laws of the country
where it was made, and the money was loaned, the fact that the
drafts were payable in New York, would not render them void under
our usury laws; except in a case where the loan of money out of
this State was a mere device to evade the operations of the law of
this State, and was intended as a cover for usury."
I do not suppose that one can well err in taking the concurring
and uncontradicted opinion of Kent and Walworth, as evidence of
what is the law of New York.
The second ground of relief relied on in the answer and counterclaim depends on the proper construction and effect of the power of
attorney given by the defendant Emily Roclofson, then Emily
Avery, to George Hatch. The power is general to make loans and
contract debts, and for such purpose to use the name of the principal. The objection taken is that the loan should have been for
money, and that taking a draft on New York was a departure from
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the power. I am rather inclined to the opinion, that the general
authority to contract debts would have authorized the purchase of a
mere security; but independent of that, the authority very clearly
implies that what is usual and customary in financial transactions
may be done. That which is equivalent to cash, or may be readily
converted into cash, may be and is usually regarded in the contracts
of parties, as amounting to the same thing. In the absence of any
fraud, I feel no doubt that it was competent for the attorney, in a
proper exercise of his power, to treat a check or draft on New York
as money.
On both of the grounds which have been taken, I shall sustain
the demurrer to so much of the answer as amounts to a counterclaim
asking affirmative relief; and the case will stand for trial on the
petition and answer.
Taft, -Key and Perry for plaintiff.
Judge James for defendant.

-In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,-April1856.
REBECCA BURR, ADatINISTRATRIX,

&C. vs.

lfAiRTIIA BURR.

1. An acknowlcdgme.nt to take a case out of the statute of limitations must not only
be clear, distinet and unequivocal, of the existence of a debt, but it must also be
plainly referable to the very debt on which the action is based.
2. The cases of Hazelbaker vs. Reeves, 2 Jones, 264, and Davis vs. Steiner, 2 Harris,
275, commented on.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by
KNox, J.-This was an action of assumpsit brought by Martha
Burr against the administratrix of her deceased son, Israel R. Burr,
upon a promissory note, of which the following is a copy:
"$400.
"Philadelphia,iiay 29, 1832.
"Three hundred and sixty-five days after date, I promise to pay
Martha Burr, four hundred dollars, or the interest thereof yearly,
at six per cent.
(Signed,) ISRAEL R. BURR."

BURR vs. BURR.

The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and the principal question in the case is, whether the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to avoid the bar of
the statute ?
Mary Penny, the daughter of the plaintiff, and the sister of the
defendant, was the only witness examined. She testified as follows:
"I knew decedent, he was my brother; plaintiff is my mother.
About two years before his death, I was present at an interview
between him and my mother, at my daughter's residence, Walnut
street, above Eighth. Mother was making a visit to me and my
daughter. In the meantime, brother Israel came to see usMother says, ' Israel, can thee let me have a little interest money
on that note which I hold of thine?' He said, 'How much would
thee like, mother ?' She said, ' Four or five dollars,' and he gave
her seven. Ie said, 'Is that sufficient?'" She said, ' It is for the
present.' They had a. conversation at the same time, but I don't
recollect what it was. I was very ill at the time; I was confined to
my bed in the second story back room in my chamber, the conversation took place there." Israel Burr, the maker of the note, died
in September, 1851.
The learned judge of the District Court, reserving the point of
the insufficiency of the evidence, charged the jury, that if they
believed the evidence, the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and the
jury returned a verdict for the amount claimed to be due on the
note, 0400 principal, and 13°2 interest, upon which verdict judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
The constructive acknowledgment of a debt arising from part
paymenrt within six years before suit brought, is sufficient from
which to infer a promise to pay. But this inference cannot be
made until the part payment is clearly established ; even where the
acknowledgment is express, instead of constructive, or the promise
direct rather than inferential. No ambiguity or uncertainty in the
one or the other can be tolerated. True, it was said in Rliazelbaker
vs. I eevee, 2 Jones, 26-1, and Davis vs. Steiner, 2 Harris, 275,
that if the acknowledgment-of the existence of a debt is clear, distinct, and unequivocal, the extent and form of the debt need not be
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stated in the acknowledgment, but may be proved in the same manner as though the statute had not been pleaded. These cases are
scarcely to be reconciled with other adjudications by this court,
upon the same point, and were not allowed the force of authority
either in Suter vs. Sheeler, 10 Harris, 309, or in Shitler vs. Bremer, 11 Harris, 413. The better rule undoubtedly is, that the acknowledgment must not only be clear, distinct and unequivocal of
the existence of a debt, but that it must also be plainly referable to
the very debt upon which the action is based. It matters not where
the uncertainty lies, whether in the acknowledgment or in the
identification, its existence is equally fatal to the plaintiff's recovery.
Take the case in hand for an illustration of the principle. There
is a statute bar to the plaintiff's cause of action; to remove this bar,
she relies upon a promise to pay within six years before the commencement of the suit. To sustain the promise, she neither gives
evidence of an express agreement to pay, nor of a direct acknowledgment that the debt was unpaid; but from a small payment of
interest, a constructive acknowledgment is to be inferred, and upon
this constructive acknowledgment, the promise to pay is based.
Let it be so; but let it first be shown that this payment of interest
was made upon the note in suit. This is the very corner-stone of
the superstructure, and if it has any inherent weakness, the action
cannot be supported by it. And here we are compelled to say, that
the evidence was too vague and uncertain, to establish a partial
payment of the note in question. The note was not present, nor
was it referred to by date,- amount, or in any manner whatever.
"Can thee let me have a little interest money on that note which
I hold of thine ?" says the mother. On what note ? The one in
suit? This is mere conjecture. It is said, that in the absence of
evidence that there was any other note given by the son to the
mother, the presumption is that this is the one upon which the payment was made. When it is recollected that this suit was commenced
after the decease of the maker of the note, against his administratrix, it is apparent that the absence of evidence proving the existence of another note or notes, does not clearly show that none such
were in existence two years before the intestate's decease. The
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burden was upon the plaintiff to prove clearly and distinctly that a
-partial payment was made upon the note sought to be recovered,
within six years from the commencement of the action. Failing in
this, the jury should have been directed to find for the defendant.
We are of opinion that the plaintiff's evidence was not sufficiently
clear and unambiguous to authorize the jury to find that the payment was made upon the note in suit. The District Court erred in
entering judgment upon the point reserved in favor of the plaintiff.
The judgment should have been for the defendant, as there was no
evidence of identity to submit to the jury.
The judgment of the District Court in favor of the plaintiffs is
reversed, and judgment is here entered for defendant, with costs.
. A. _Phillips, for plaintiff in error.
J.M'ntyre for defendant in error.

In the Supreme Court of -Pennsyflvania,May, 1856.
FREDERICK GAUL VS. BENJAIMIN Ii. WILLIS.

1. It is fully settled in Pennsylvania, that a vendee has a right to purchase a
security at a greater discount than* 6 per cent., but he must be a purchaser in
good faith, and not participate in any contrivance to evade the statute against
usury.
2. The difference between the English and the rennsylvania statutes against usury
stated.
3. Where A draws a promissory note in the usual form, to raise money by its sale,
purporting to be "1for value received," and B endorses the note to C, who sells it
to D at a discount of one and one-half per cent. per month, the latter having no
notice whatever, of the purpose for which the note was made, and having neither
loaned nor intended to loan money on it to the maker or first endorser, A, cannot

be heard even after a release, to give evidence to invalidate the security in the
hands of D, a bona fide holder, on the ground of usury or failure in the original
consideration.

The opinion, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
LEWIs, C. J.-Frederick Gaul, the defendant below, loaned his
note to William C. Rudman, for the purpose of enabling the latter
to raise money by the sale of it. The note was drawn in the usual
form of negotiable instruments, and expressed on its face to have
36
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been given for " value received," although there was in fact no debt
due from Gaul to Rudman. Rudman endorsed the note and sold it
to Drexel & Co. They in turn, disposed of it, to Benjamin B. Willis,
at a discount equal to one and a-half per cent. per month. Neither
Drexel & Co., nor Willis, had any knowledge of the purpose for
which the note was given. They had a right to put faith in the
representation on the face of the paper, that it was given for a
valuable consideration. As against the parties who made that
representation, the note must be held to be as they represented it.
This is a principle of equity applicable to all business transactions ;
but it is so indispensable, in the transfer of negotiable securities,
that a party to such an instrument cannot be received, even after a
release, to give evidence to invalidate it in the hands of a bonafide
holder, on the ground of usury, or for any other cause touching the
original consideration. Walton vs. Shelby, 1 T. R. 800; Griffith
vs. Redford, 1 Rawle, 196. This brings us to the question: Is
Benjamin B. Willis a bona fide holder ? If he participated in any
contrivance to evade the statute against usury, he would not be a
purchaser in good faith. But we have already seen that he had no
notice whatever, of the purpose for which the note was made. He
neither loaned, nor intended to loan money to Rudman, or to Gaul.
He had no transaction of any kind with them, or with either of
them. His dealings were with Drexel & Co. There was no intention on the part of the latter to borrow, and no engagement to return
the money received, or any part of it, or to pay any sum whatever
for the use of it. Nor was there any intention on the part of
Willis to lend money to them. It was a clear purchase of the
-security, and nothing else. Had he a right to purchase it at a
greater discount than six per cent. ? That he had was fully settled
so long ago as 1785. Wyckoff vs. Louglhead, 2 Dallas, 92; Musgrave vs. Gibbs, 1 Dallas, 216. Although the period of credit given
in the instrument is usually spoken of in fixing upon the discount,
it is not the only element that enters into the calculation. The
value of the security is determined by the present responsibility of
the parties bound for it, the probabilities of their continued ability
to pay, and their character for punctuality in meeting their engage-
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ments. As the parties to the sale of the security were competent
to manage their own affairs, that agreement, fixing the value of the
note, when fairly made, is as binding as any other contract. It is
true that if the note was absolutely void, there might be an insuperable obstacle to a recovery on it, however fairly acquired. But in
this particular the English statutes against usury differ from our
own. The former declared that all securities made in violation of
them were "utterly void ;" 13 Eliz. cap. 8; 3 Hen. vii. c. 5; 13
Geo. 3 c. 63. The latter contains no such provision. The result
was that the English courts were bound to declare that all such securities were absolutely void even in the hands of innocent purchasers.
But in this State the law has always been that even between the
original parties such securities are valid for the real debt and legal
interest. The excess cannot be recovered by one who participated
in the contrivance to evade the statute, because he has no right to
recover at law what the law prohibits him from contracting for or
receiving. But as an innocent purchaser of such a security violates
no law, he is of course entitled to recover the amount which, on the
face of the instrument, appears to be due. The District Court was
therefore correct in giving judgment for the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.

RECENT

ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

Court of Queen's Bench, Hilary Term,-January,1856.
HAWTKINS VS. TWYZILL.

The rule which deprived the seamen of wages if no freightwas earned, does not apply to the master of a ship; and therefore, where a ship was lost, the administratrix of the captain was entitled to maintain an action for wages for the period of
his service before the loss.

This was an action by the plaintiff, as administratrix, against the
owner of the ship Britannia for wages due to the deceased as captain.
The defendant paid 12Z. into court. On the trial, before Crowder, J., at the Summer Assizes at Durham in 1855, it appeared that
the deceased was engaged for the voyage at 101. per month, and

HAWKINS vs. TWYZILL.

that the ship sailed from Cardiff to Alicante, in Spain, where she
discharged her cargo, and thence proceeded on her voyage, and was
lost. The plaintiff claimed 601., being at the rate of 101 per month
from the time of the sailing from Cardiff to the time of the loss. The
defendant contended that 121. covered the amount of wages up to
the time of the arrival of the ship at Alicante, and objected that the
contract was entire, and as there was no proof that the ship had
earned freight subsequently to her sailing from Alicantb, wages
which accrued subsequently could not be recovered. The learned
judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff for 181. In the following
Michaelmas Term, (Nov. 5),
Tem2le obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection; against which, in this term, (Jan. 17),
Atherton and Digby Seymour showed cause.-The maxim in our
maritime law, that freight is the mother of wages, Lord Stowell, in
The Neptune, (1 Hagg. 227, 231), does not apply to the captain.
He may insure his wages. [Lord CAMPnELL, C. J.-Does not that
rather show that his wages would be lost unles they were insured?]
In Maude & Pollock on Shipping, p. 216, it is said. "The law of
England, as of most other countries, forbids, on grounds of public
policy, the insurance of seamen's wages, or of any equivalent which
they may be entitled to receive in their stead. This rule does not.
however, apply to the wages of the master." And in p. 55, "Unlike the other mariners, he may insure his wages, since tme objections
in the former case do not apply to that of the master, who is entitled
to his wages although the ship be lost or captured ;" citing _King vs.
Glover (2 N. R. 206) and Webster vs. De Tastet, (7 T. R. 157).
In the former case, Chambre, J., said, (p. 210), "T h e common law
follows the marine law in fot allowing wages to be due till-the safe
arrival of the ship. This rule applies to the mariners, but there is
no decision in the marine law prohibiting the captain from recovering
his wages up to the time his ship is captured. Indeed, the captain
and the mariners are treated as very different subjects of consideration in the marine law." For instance, the master had no lien on
the ship or freight for his wages, ( Wilkins vs. Carmichael, 1 Dougl.
101; Smith v. Plummer, 1 B. & Ad. 575), until the law was altered
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by sec. 16 of Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c 112, and sect. 191 of the Merchant
Shipping Act, 1854, (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104) ; also the master cannot
sue in the Admirality Court for his wages. (Sir W. Scott, in The
Favorite, 2 W. Rob. 232, 237,) [CROMPTON, J., referred to The
Galedonia,] In 1 Arm. Ins. 208, it is said," The principle upon
which this rule"-viz. that seamen are not allowed to insure their
wages -" is founded, is held not to apply to the master, who is
regarded as a person of too much trust and character to be rendered indifferent to the fate of the adventure merely by having
secured his own interest in it." [WIGITMAN J.-If the captain
is entitled to wages, though the ship be lost, what is the risk
against which he insures?] The failure of wages which he would
have earned during the period between the loss of the ship and the
end of the voyage. By sect. 17 of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112," in all
cases of wreck or loss of the ship, every surviving seaman shall be
entitled to his wages up to the period of the wreck or loss of the ship,
whether such ship shall or shall not have previously earned freight;
provided the seaman shall produce a certificate from the master or
chief surviving officer of the ship, to the effect that he had exerted
himself to the utmost to save the ship, cargo and stores." The master cannot give himself -a-certificate; and there being no provision
for the payment of wages to the captain in the case of wreck or loss
of the ship, shows that the legislature considered that he was entitled at common law. The term " seaman" is not made by the interpretation clause, sect. 63, to include the master. There is the
same silence respecting the master, in sect. 183 of the Merchant
Shipping Act, 1854, (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104).
Jan. 21.- Temple and Unthank, contra.-The doctrine'contended
for on the other side is not to be found in the older text-writers,
though the distinction between the master and the mariner in other
matters is noticed. In Lord Tenterden on Shipping, part 5, c.2,
p. 619, 7th ed., which was written after the decision in King vs. Glover, (2 N. R. 206), it is said, "All that is said in this and the following chapter respecting seamen is to be understood of all the officers in the ship except the master, and of him also if the subject is
not inapplicable to his situation and character ;" and in p. 625," The
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payment of wages is generally dependent upon the payment of
freight; if the ship has earned its freight, the seamen who have
served on board the ship have in like manner earned their wages.
Again, in p. 6 31, "In the case of shipwreck it is the duty of the seamen
to exert themselves to the utmost to save as much as possible of the
vessel and cargo; if the cargo is saved, and a proportion of the
freight paid by the merchant in respect thereof, it seems, upon principle, that the seamen are also entitled to a proportion of their wages,
and this is expressly directed by the French ordinance." These
passages are applicable to the master as well as the seamen, because
they have reference to the point whether the voyage is profitable.
So the contract for the wages of the master as well as of the seamen
is entire for the whole voyage. [ They cited Lord Tenterden on Shipping, part 5, c. 3, p. 638.] [ Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-Generally the
master is appointed, not for a particular voyage, but at monthly wages, in whatever trade the ship is employed. He is put on the registry as master, and so remains from voyage to voyage. CROMPTON,
J.-His duties are not confined to the particular voyage; he has
duties while the ship is in port.] No practice is observed in mercantile transactions of appointing the master generally for all voyages. The master, in practice, only gets wages during the voyage
and for the voyage; though, if he is actually employed about the
vessel in the ship's port, he is entitled to wages pro tanto. While
he is in port he does not get his keep, and his name may be taken
off the register. There is an implied contract for each voyage, and
there is no reason why his wages should not depend upon freight
being earned, just as much as the wages of the seamen. [ CGoMPTON, J.-If Lord Tenterden meant to lay down any other rule than
that stated in Kfing vs. Glover, (2 N. R. 206), he would probably
have so said.] That was an insurance case, and the dicta of Chain.bre, J. were unnecessary; and the true reason of the decision in
that case is, that the captain being in greater trust and confidence,
it is assumed that he will not be influenced by motives to which the
mariners are subject. ( Park. Ins. 11, 12, 8th ed. ) Stat. 17 & 18
Vict. c. 104, s. 103, which was past to correct the evils of former
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legislation, relaxed the rule in favor of the mariners, but not in favor of
the master. [ They also referred to sect. 109.]
Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-The question upon which our judgment
turns is, whether the maxim that freight is the mother of wages, applies to the master of a ship. The facts of this case are, that the
master was engaged by the defendant at the wages of 101. a month;
that he had served four months on board, acting as master from the
time when the ship sailed from Alicante until it went down and was
lost. The question is, whether his representative is debarred from
making this claim because no freight was earned between the sailing
from Alicante and the loss of the ship. No authority was shown in
which it has been expressly decided that the master is included in
the rule, but it was urged strongly on the other side that there is
no decision to exclude the master from the rule, and that no textwriter until very lately has made any distinction in this respect between the master and an ordinary seaman. That there has been no
decision may be accounted for from the circumstance that it was
understood that the rule did not apply to the master, and therefore
the claim of the master was never resisted, and there was no occasion
to bring an action, whereby the question should receive a judicial
decision. Until Arnauld on Insusance, and the more recent treatise
of Pollock & Maude on Shipping, it had not been expreesly laid down
that the rule did not apply to the master, but in all the text-writers
it seems to have been taken for granted ; and the reasoning on which
it has been so laid down proceeds on that in King vs. Glover (2 N.
R. 206 ) and Webster vs. De Tastet,( 7 T. R. 157 ), where it was
held that the master's wages might be insured. All the courts have
taken for granted that the master's wages did not depend on freight;
and there is the express dictum of that most eminent judge, Chambre, J., who gives it as the ratio decideudi in King vs. Glover. The
Legislature, in stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, and the more recent statute,
17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, legislated on the supposition that the rule did
not apply to the master, because in stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, by
which the supposed hardship of the common rule in favor of seamen
is removed, no mode is.pointed out in which the master of the ship
s relieved; and stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 183, and other see-
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tions which are applicable, give no remedy to the master, which it
is clear that they would have done if the Legislature had thought
that he was within the rule. Generally speaking, the sailors are
engaged for the voyage, and the completion of the voyage was made
by the common law the contingency on which their wages were
earned. But the engagement of the master and his functions are different from those of the mariners; he is not engaged for the voyage,
but as master of the ship; he is master before the voyage begins ;
he hires the men, and when the ship has reached the end of its voyage
and has delivered its cargo, his functions continue -he is still master of the ship,_and entitled to the wages which he has stipulated forWhen engaged for distant voyages he is generally an educated man,
who it is supposed will not from interested and sordid motives relax
from his duties; and therefore it is not necessary to stimulate his
zeal and attention under perilous circumstances, by making the payment of his wages depend on the successful termination of the voyage. These are the reasons which seem to have led to the distinc
tion between the master and the mariners in this respect.
COLERIDGE, J.-I
confess that the point is new, whether the rule in
question applies to the master: there is no express authority. Then
we must look to principle, and see whether the situation of the parties is the same. The situation of mariners may be considered partly
in respect of the term for which they contract, and partly in respect of their duties; and it was necessary to put this screw upon
them, so that they might not only be honest, but earnest and zealous
inthe performance of services often very perilous. Does the same
reason exist with regard to the master ? In the first place, he is not
ordinarily engaged for the voyage; he has duties to perform in harbor as well as at sea; and he is usually in a different position of
life. Therefore there is a difference in the contract and character
of the parties. Also, in the analogous case of the insurance of wages,
it has been decided on the same ground that a mariner cannot insure his wages; but that rule has been held not to apply to the master. The third observation is, that in the statutes by which the Legislature mitigated the rule with regard to seamen, itis silent as to
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the master, though the same reasons existed with regard to the mas-.
ter, if the rule included, him.
WIGHTMAIN, 3.-The argument for the defendant is founded on
the assumption that the rule, that the wages of the seamen are not
recoverable if the ship is lost, applies. But the situation of the master is essentially different from that of the mariners. He has often
a special interest in the ship, and he is bound to make a contract
for the hiring of the other mariners. There is no case in which
it has been held, that the master is included in the rule that
freight is the mother of wages. But there is the case of King vs.
Glover, (2 N. R. 206), fifty years ago, which has never been controverted, in which the distinction was taken between the master
and the mariners. Lord Mansfield, 0. 3., whose ruling at the trial
was called in question, says, (p. 209 ), "1When the case of Webster vs.
De Tastet was first cited to me at Nisi Prius, it did not occur to me
that there was any difference in the rule of law as applied to the
captain of a ship and the mariners; but upon considering the two
cases, both upon principle and in practice, there does appear a most
material difference." He adds, that the regulation against the insurance of wages is founded on the marine law, which does not allow
the mariners any wages unless the ship earn freight; and then he
takes, in terms, the very distinction between the captain and the
mariners which is now insisted on for the plaintiff. This case, which
is founded on the essential difference between the captain and the
mariners with respect to wages, has, as far as we know, been always acquiesced in, and must be taken to be law. The statutes also,
which have been referred to, show that the Legislature thought that
the master was not within the rule.
CROMPTON, 3., concurred. Rule discharged.

BLYTH vs. THE BIRMINGHAM WATERWORKS.

Court of -Exchequer, Sittings in Banc after Hfilary Term,
February, 6th, 1856.
BLYTH vs. THE BIRIINGHAM WATERWORKS COMPANY.
1. A party who takes reasonable care to guard against accidents arising from ordi-

nary causes is not liable for accidents arising from extraordinary ones; and therefore
2. Where a company incorporated for supplying a street with water constructed
their apparatus according to the best known system, and kept it in proper repair
for twenty-five years, at the end of which time a frost of unusual severity acted
on the apparatus, so as to cause injury to the property of another person-Held,
that the company were not liable for negligence.
Per ALDERSON, B.-Negligencc consists in the omitting to do something that a
reasonable man would do, or the doing something that a reasonable man would
not do ; in either case causing, unintentionally, mischief to a third party.

This was an appeal from the decision of the county court of
Warwickshire, holden at Birmingham. The action was for negligence, and was tried before the judge of the county court and a
jury. The plaintiff was in the occupation of a dwelling-house, -with
cellarage, in Woodcock-street, Birmingham. By the 7 Geo. 4, c.
109 the defendants were incorporated as a company for the purpose
of supplying Birmingham and the parts adjacent with water. The
statute directed that whenever the company should lay down any
main or other pipe in any street, &c., they should fix and place
proper and sufficient fire-plugs in it; also that all pipes and conduits
should be laid eighteen inches at least from the surface of the soil;
and that all the mains to be laid down and used should at all times
be kept charged full of water. The defendants, acting under this
statute, laid a main pipe for the purpose of conveying water along
Woodcock-street, Birmingham, which main was placed more th.n
eighteen inches deep, and at a reasonable distance from the plaintiff's premises, and upon the main they placed a fire-plug, constructed according to the best known system. The apparatus connected
with this was as follows: The lower part of a wooden plug was
inserted, and fitted tight in a neck projecting above and forming
part of the main. All round this neck, and extending both above
and below it, was a bed of brickwork, puddled round with clay.
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The plug was also enclosed in a cast-iron tube placed upon and
fixed to the brickwork, and on the top of which, level with the
surface of the street, was a movable iron stopper, having a hole in
the top of it for the insertion of the key by which the plug was
loosened when necessity arose. The plug did not fit tight to the
tube, but room was left for it to move freely when occasion required,
and this space was necessarily left for the purpose of easily and
quickly removing the wooden plug to allow the water to flow. On
the removal of the wooden plug the pressure upon the main forced
the water up through the fieck and cap to the surface of the street.
On the 24th February, 1855, a large quantity of water, escaping
from the neck of the main pipe just opposite the plaintiff's house,
forced its way through the ground into his cellar, doing considerable mischief, to recover damages for which he brought the present
action. Immediately after the accident the defendants sent men
to the spot to discover the cause of it, but in consequence of their
not digging deep enough they were unsuccessfil, and the cause was
not discovered until several months after, when the defendants' men
were digging up the earth round the plug in order to remove the
brickwork. One of the severest frosts on record set in on the 15th
January preceding, and continued up to the time of the accident.
An incrustation of ice and snow had gathered about the stopper
and in the street all round, and also for some inches between the
stopper and the plug. The ice had been observed on the surface
of the ground for a considerable time before the accident, and a
short time after it the turneock of the defendants removed the ice
from the stopper, took out the plug, and replaced it. The engineer
of the defendants, who was examined as a witness, said he thought
the accident might have been caused by the frost in this way-the
expansion of the ice from thaw forced the plug out of the neck of
the main, when, the stopper being incrusted with ice, the plug could
.not ascend; and the water, being thus unable to
force its way
through the usual channel, penetrated through the brickwork round
the neck of the main, and thence forced its way into the plaintiff's
cellar. The apparatus of the defendants was laid down twenty-five
years before the accident, .and had always worked well. The main
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had not been examined during that time, but three or four months
before the accident the plug had been examined, and was found in
good repair. On this state of facts the judge told the jury that the
defendants must have known of the frost, and might have calculated
its probable effects; and it was for them to say whether the defendants had exercised proper care to avert any ill consequences arising
therefrom; if not, they were liable for negligence, in which case the
jury should assess the amount of damages. The jury found for the
plaintiff. This case was argued by
C. B.- Kennedy, for the plaintiff; and
Field, for the defendants.
Aldridge vs. The Great Western Railway Company (3 Man.
& G. 515; 4 Scott's N. R. 156.) and Siordet vs. Rall (4 Bing.607)
were cited.
ALDERSOx, B.-I have attended as well as I could to the argument in this case, and am clearly of opinion that the defendants are
not liable. Negligence I define to be, either the omitting to do
something that a reasonable man would do, or the doing something
t1hat a reasonable man would not do; in either case causing mischief
to a third party; not intentionally, for then it would not be negligence. Now, what would a reasonable man have done in the present
case ? He would have gone according to the average state of the
temperature, and its average consequences. It appears'that a frost
set in in January and continued to the end of February, and of
course a quantity of ice lay on the ground. The defendants are
compelled by their act of Parliament to keep a fit plug in the street
communicating with the main of the waterworks below, so that in
ordinary cases of frost no water could have reached the plaintiff's
cellar. We know that frost only penetrates to a certain distance
below the surface of the earth, and surely if you provide for the
case of ordinary accidents, you are not liable for extraordinary ones
like the present. Suppose you place your apparatus at such a
depth as is sufficient to guard against the consequences of the frost
that is usual in this country, it would be monstrous to say that you
are liable because in the year 1855 God sends such a frost as
penetrates to the same depth as the frost in Lapland or the polar
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regions. No reasonable man would apprehend such a thing, or make
provision for it. The curious part of the present case is, that on
the night of the accident the defendants tried to discover how the
water came into the plaintiff's cellar, but did not find it out until
many months afterwards, when they dug down and found the cause
of the accident in the preceding February; so that after the frost
had gone the apparatus appears to have acted satisfactorily. The
whole thing was an accident occasioned by frost, which was utterly
unforeseen, and the cause of which was not discovered till long after,
though the defendants looked for it. That cannot be called negligence.
MAniN, B.-The judge of the county court did not decide
rightly in this case. It is clear that by the law of England, in
order to make the defendants responsible there must have been
some negligence on their part, and it was for the judge to say
whether there was any evidence of it. Here was a plug fixed in a
pipe, and if found for twenty-five years to be good against the effects
of frost, why should not the defendants have supposed it would serve
the same purpose in future? And if so, how can a man be guilty
of negligence in not making provision for what he could not foresee ?
Such a doctrine would make the company insurers against all
consequences of accummulation of water in their pipes. The judge
was, therefore, not correct in leaving this case to the jury. There
was no evidence of negligence for them to consider, and if the plaintiff did not consent to be nonsuited, the judge should have told them,
as matter of law, to find for the defendants.
BRAMWELL, B.-These defendants are bound by law to lay down
these pipes, and have fit plugs for them, and they did properly all
they were required to do. I doubt if the defendants were bound to
remove the ice round the stopper of the plug, even if they apprehended
the probable consequence of its remaining there; for the statute
merely says they shall have a proper plug, and consequently, if the
ice gets above that place, they have nothing to do with it; and I
further doubt whether it might not be retaliated on the plaintiff,
"Why did not you remove the ice yourself?" But however that
may be, wouldit not be monstrous to hold a person liable for neg-

